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The Supreme Court 
Speaks to the Untenured: 
A Comment on Board of Regents v. Roth 
and Perry v. Sindermann 
William Van Alstyne 
On June 29th, 1972, the Supreme Court handed down its 
first decisions directed to the procedural rights of un- 
tenured faculty. The results were mixed and not uncom- 
plicated. (The full Opinions are printed at 406 U.S. 
			 , 
92 S. Ct. 2694, 40 U.S.L.W. 5079.) In Board of Regents 
v. Roth, by a vote of five to three (Brennan, Douglas, and 
Marshall dissenting, the three Nixon appoirtees joining 
White and Stewart in the majority, Powell taking no part), 
the Court appeared to hold essentially that untenured 
faculty members have no constitutional right to any pro- 
cedural observances in the nonrenewal of their appoint- 
ments. In Perry v. Sindermann, however, the Court 
agreed unanimously that the technical absence of formal 
tenure was not conclusive of the faculty member's proce- 
dural rights and that proof of de facto tenure would en- 
title him to some degree of explanation and opportunity 
for reconsideration. In between, the Court appears to 
have left room for a concept of quasi-tenure applicable to 
significant numbers of regular faculty members, a terra 
incognita that may well raise serious practical questions 
for general institutional policy in cases of nonrenewal or 
nonreappointment. The larger implications of both cases 
may appropriately be pursued in the detailed analyses of 
the professional law journals. This Comment will confine 
itself to a brief review of the decisions plus a closing 
observation about their relevance to the AAUP's State- 
ment on Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Non- 
renewal of Faculty Appointments. 
The Reductionism of Roth: The Untenured Faculty 
Member as a Limited Appointee Entitled to No 
Further Consideration 
The constitutional issue of pretermination procedural 
rights was raised most starkly in Roth, a case involving 
an assistant professor of political science at Wisconsin 
State University-Oshkosh, who received unexplained 
notice in January of his first year of teaching advising him 
that he would not be reappointed for the next academic 
year. The notice came shortly after Professor Roth had 
made a number of public statements critical of the Uni- 
versity administrators and board of regents, and Professor 
Roth was one of only 4 (of 442) untenured faculty mem- 
bers at the University whose appointments were not re- 
newed that year. In his complaint in the federal district 
court, Professor Roth alleged that the University's sum- 
mary action of unexplained notice without opportunity 
for hearing or reconsideration violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment provision that no state shall deprive any per- 
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law. 
The district court sustained Professor Roth's position 
to the extent of holding that due process required the 
University administration to respond to a request for an 
explanation of its decision to discontinue him and to grant 
him some opportunity to be heard on reconsideration of 
the matter, albeit with the burden being his to show that 
the stated reasons were either "wholly inappropriate as 
a basis for decision or that they [were] wholly without 
basis in fact." Only then, the district court added, "would 
the university administration become obliged to show that 
the stated reasons are not inappropriate or that they have 
a basis in fact." (310 F. Supp. 972, 980 [W.D. Wis. 
1970]). The University appealed from this decision, but 
the court of appeals affirmed and the case thereafter went 
to the Supreme Court where it was consolidated with 
Perry v. Sindermann for argument. 
The Supreme Court majority found it unnecessary to 
determine whether the district court had erred in its 
specification of the particular procedural rights it had 
determined to be required by due process. Rather, the 
majority held that the clause did not apply at all: 
[Respondent has not shown that he was deprived of liberty 
or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. 
Analytically, the majority treated Professor Roth's situ- 
ation exactly on the same footing as that which would be 
appropriate in respect to a special or limited appointment 
for a single year, the kind of situation where even notice 
of nonreappointment would itself be anomalous because 
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it could only be regarded by the special appointee himself 
as a gratuitous discourtesy. By placing Professor Roth in 
this different frame, as though he were not a regular 
appointee and as though there were no significant distinc- 
tions between his situation and that of a special one-year 
terminal appointment, the majority of the Supreme Court 
reduced his constitutionally cognizable substantive inter- 
ests in reappointment to zero. It followed smoothly that 
the due process clause had not been triggered and thus, 
in a constitutional sense, no process of law was due Pro- 
fessor Roth at all. 
The position of the majority was unaffected by the fact 
that nonrenewal of untenured faculty members at Oshkosh 
was apparently highly exceptional at the time, a point the 
district court had emphasized both in terms of its evi- 
dentiary force regarding the real implications of regular 
appointment at the institution and its relevance in measur- 
ing the real burden to the University to provide some 
opportunity for reconsideration in the occasional case of 
nonrenewal. That this matter was felt by the Supreme 
Court majority to be of too little significance, rather than 
that it might somehow have been overlooked, seems clear 
from the fact that a footnote in the majority Opinion 
obliquely refers to it. That the decision is indeed a signifi- 
cant one which will not be easy to distinguish or to limit 
is further attested by the fact that the majority was also 
aware of the coincidence that notice of nonrenewal fol- 
lowed shortly after Professor Roth's critical public utter- 
ances. (The district court had stressed the coincidence as 
lending additional weight to some right to explanation and 
pretermination review as an important means of protect- 
ing the faculty member's substantive First Amendment 
freedom of speech.) Finally, the majority was not inclined 
to view the case as distinguishable from one of a limited 
one-year special appointment in spite of the possible far 
greater difficulty Professor Roth might expect to en- 
counter in finding a position somewhere else after un- 
explained termination from Oshkosh following his very 
first year as a regular faculty member, a point also stressed 
by the district and circuit courts in holding in his favor. 
The different view of the Supreme Court majority appears 
in the trailing portion of still another footnote: 
Mere proof . . . that his record of nonretention in one job, 
taken alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to 
some other employers would hardly establish the kind of 
foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of 
"liberty" [sufficient to entitle him to some measure of pre- 
termination procedural due process]. 
Given the analytic basis of the decision, Roth neces- 
sarily deals a heavy blow to further claims by untenured 
faculty members to procedural rights in the consideration 
of reappointment, at least as a matter of constitutional 
right. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in this case 
not only reversed the judgment of the seventh circuit, but 
simultaneously rejected decisions from the fifth and first 
circuits (with federal appellate jurisdiction in the South 
and New England respectively) which had previously 
held that some measure of pretermination procedural due 
process was constitutionally required in circumstances like 
those in Roth. 
Nevertheless, the different result in Perry v. Sindermann 
(decided the same day) complicates the picture a good 
deal and provides room for a number of important sec- 
ond thoughts. 
The Realism of Sindermann: De Facto Tenure and 
the Importance of Collateral Effects 
Neither his letter of appointment nor any state statute 
provided Professor Robert Sindermann with tenure as a 
regular faculty member at Odessa Junior College when, 
in May, 1969, the Texas Board of Regents voted not to 
renew the latest in the series of one-year appointments he 
had held at the College. A lead sentence in the College's 
official Faculty Guide itself declared, moreover, that 
"Odessa College has no tenure system." Professor Sinder- 
mann's situation at Odessa might therefore appear to have 
been indistinguishable from that of Professor Roth at 
Oshkosh. Accordingly, the same outcome might have 
been expected in the Supreme Court after the Texas 
Regents had secured review of the decision of the fifth 
circuit that had held in favor of Professor Sindermann's 
claim for some measure of pretermination procedural due 
process. (The two cases were also similar in the co- 
incidence that Professor Sindermann's unexplained notice 
of nonrenewal followed shortly on the heels of news 
reports of his public and political activities.) 
Unlike David Roth, however, Professor Sindermann 
was in his tenth year of full-time faculty service, the last 
four of which he had served at Odessa (including service 
for a time as cochairman of the department of govern- 
ment and social science). Notwithstanding the formal 
disclaimer of any tenure system, moreover, official publi- 
cations of the College and of the Coordinating Board of 
the Texas College and University System clearly implied 
the existence of a de facto tenure policy at Odessa, a 
policy arguably covering Professor Sindermann since it 
adhered to AAUP standards in providing for credit for 
three years service at other institutions. Noting that Pro- 
fessor Sindermann alleged that he met the terms of that 
policy and had relied upon it, the Supreme Court first 
distinguished Roth in holding that here more than "a 
mere subjective 'expectancy' " of reappointment was in- 
volved. Accordingly, it held that proof by Sindermann 
that tenure protection was implied in fact in his case 
would be sufficient demonstration of an existing "prop- 
erty interest" in reappointment to trigger the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thus to require some degree of intra- 
mural procedural due process before he could be deprived 
of that interest. 
Up to this point, the Sindermann Opinion is encourag- 
ing: dry legalism is not utterly dispositive of professional 
security and the technical absence of formally conferred 
de jure tenure is not always controlling of one's right to 
intramural procedural due process in case of nonre- 
appointment. Even where the state may not have adopted 
a formal tenure system and a faculty member's letter of 
appointment may itself refer only to a specific term, the 
existence of an official policy or authoritative practice 
akin to tenure may imply some degree of intramural pro- 
cedural due process as a matter of constitutional right. 
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Nevertheless, in what may be hoped to have been casual 
dicta added at the close of Mr. Justice Stewart's Opinion 
for the majority, the description of the kind of procedural 
due process constitutionally assured a faculty member 
under these circumstances is breathtakingly slight: 
Proof of such a property interest would not, of course, en- 
title him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate 
college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he 
could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and 
challenge their sufficiency. 
Thus, the Court appears to declare that even one with de 
facto tenure may not be entitled as a matter of constitu- 
tional right to any pretermination procedural due process. 
Rather, much like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in 
Wonderland, the administration may declare "sentence 
first, trial and verdict later." Moreover, the burden 
would apparently be placed upon the faculty member 
seeking reinstatement to overcome a presumption of 
regularity accompanying the statement of grounds for 
termination presented by the administration in that hear- 
ing. While it is very doubtful that the Court meant in any 
way also to imply that such a post hoc procedure with its 
reversal of the burden of proof is constitutionally suffi- 
cient where tenure has been conferred de jure, it nonethe- 
less managed by this statement to take away much of the 
little good it had just done in identifying conditions of 
de facto tenure, by thus immediately eroding its strength 
in terms of its constitutionally required procedural en- 
titlements. 
A similar qualification characterized still another por- 
tion of the Opinions that otherwise acknowledged a 
limited constitutional right to procedural due process 
under special circumstances of nonrenewal. In Roth, the 
Court was careful to distinguish what it deemed to be the 
ordinary and foreseeable hardship of an unexplained 
nonrenewal at the end of an initial one-year academic 
appointment from other kinds of collateral consequences 
which would be sufficient to require procedural due 
process insofar as the university might itself be directly 
responsible for those collateral consequences. Specifically, 
Mr. Justice Stewart laid considerable stress on the fact 
that in declining to rehire Professor Roth "[t]he State . . . 
did not make any charge against him that might seriously 
damage his standing and association in his community": 
Had it done so, this would be a different case. For 
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor or in- 
tegrity is at stake because of what the government is doing 
to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essen- 
tial." 
Mr. Justice Stewart also stressed that the decision of non- 
renewal in Roth did not itself authoritatively foreclose 
Professor Roth from any other employment opportunities, 
i.e., it did not operate as a matter of law to bar him from 
consideration elsewhere even assuming that other institu- 
tions might regard the fact of his nonreappointment at 
Oshkosh as a matter of some practical significance. He 
was quick to add, moreover, that the collateral effect of 
a larger legal consequence accompanying nonrenewal 
would describe a different case and might well require 
the observance of procedural due process. 
Even so, the character of intramural procedural due 
process which the presence of either of these collateral 
effects beyond per se nonrenewal may make available to 
the distressed faculty member is evidently limited to the 
possibility of securing relief only from the effects them- 
selves. Success in refuting the institution's discrediting 
public statements in the course of a university hearing 
would still not entitle the faculty member to reinstatement. 
Again, the point is discoverable in a footnote: 
In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to 
refute the charge before University officials.12 
12 The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person 
an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name 
at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons. 
The logic of this position is perfectly straightforward, 
namely, that water cannot rise higher than its source: 
since a post hoc hearing is constitutionally required only 
because of collateral injury to reputation resulting from 
damaging public statements by the institution and not at 
all because of nonrenewal per se, the relief it provides is 
solely for the benefit of reputation and not in contempla- 
tion of reinstatement. Although the Court did not ex- 
pressly say so (and quoted dicta from other cases imply- 
ing the contrary), moreover, the logic of its position may 
likewise imply that the only required purpose of providing 
a hearing where the decision of nonrenewal would author- 
itatively foreclose other employment would be to provide 
an opportunity to rescind that particular collateral effect 
without, however, securing reinstatement within the insti- 
tution itself. 
Even so, the result suggested above is very much open 
to doubt and subject to reasonable dispute. If a public 
institution failed to renew a faculty member's appoint- 
ment solely because it originally believed certain things to 
be true which a fair hearing subsequently established to 
be false (even assuming that the opportunity to have 
proved them false would not have been provided except 
that it was constitutionally required because the institution 
made a public statement about the matter), continued 
refusal to renew the appointment might then be success- 
fully challenged on the basis that it can only be explained 
as an arbitrary reaction, i.e., as an arbitrary refusal to 
treat the faculty member on equal terms with others whose 
appointments were renewed, discriminating against him 
solely on the basis of an earlier belief of unfitness since 
refuted in a fair hearing. As the hearing itself was a 
matter of constitutional right, moreover, the institution 
could not hope to defend itself on the basis that the 
faculty member's decision to press for a hearing was itself 
sufficient evidence of lack of trust or temperamental in- 
compatibility to decline to reinstate him. 
The Terra Incognita of Quasi-Tenure and the Better 
Position of AAUP Policy 
With all of this uncertainty stemming from the 
Opinions in Roth and Sindermann, there is yet another 
complexity that warrants examination. Between the ten- 
year instance of termination under an alleged policy of 
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de facto tenure (as in Sindermann) and the first-year 
instance of nonreappointment under circumstances where 
the Court found that neither an explanation nor an oppor- 
tunity for reconsideration is constitutionally required (as 
in Roth), there is a great deal of terra incognita where 
the majority of untenured faculty members and official 
institutional policies are actually to be found. 
In Roth, Mr. Justice Stewart (writing for the majority) 
may well have been troubled by the lack of sufficient sub- 
stance to David Roth's claim of any officially encouraged 
expectation of reappointment to fit it by analogy to a 
qualified or contingent "property" right, suitably to dis- 
tinguish it from the claim of a disappointed first-time 
applicant or special appointee. The record in the Roth 
case, judged by Mr. Justice Stewart's characterization of 
it, left some things to be desired to the extent that it may 
not have indicated that there were official statements of 
criteria for reappointment and progress toward tenure 
consideration - statements which might have helped David 
Roth to provide a line of constitutional distinction in 
either of the two respects the majority of the Court evi- 
dently believed to be important. Designation of his 
appointment as a regular member of the faculty coupled 
with official assurances objectively encouraging him to 
anticipate reappointment upon satisfactory service as de- 
fined in reasonably attainable standards might have gen- 
erated more substance to the view that he possessed a 
contingent property interest of which he could not be 
deprived without some measure of intramural due process. 
Similarly, official provision of standards contemplating 
reappointment in the absence of professional shortcoming 
or immoral conduct might have rendered an otherwise 
unexplained nonrenewal decision so great a slur upon the 
appointee's professional or personal standing as to be 
viewed as a deprivation of "liberty" (of reputation or 
contract) triggering the Fourteenth Amendment's guar- 
antee of due process. It may not parse phrases too closely 
to aggregate all of Mr. Justice Stewart's qualifying obser- 
vations about the record in the Roth case, for instance, 
in suggesting that the decision may yet permit meaning- 
ful distinctions to be made in the future: 
[O]n the record before us, all that clearly appears is that 
the respondent was not rehired for one year at one Uni- 
versity. . . . [The terms of his appointment] did not provide 
for contract renewal absent "sufficient cause." Indeed, they 
made no provision for renewal whatsoever. . . . Nor, sig- 
nificantly, was there any state statute or University rule or 
policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that 
created any legitimate claim to it. ... In the present case 
. . . there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent's 
interest in his "good name, reputation, honor or integrity" 
is at stake. . . . The District Court made an assumption 
"that non-retention by one university or college creates con- 
crete and practical difficulties for a professor in his subse- 
quent academic career. . . . But even assuming arguendo 
that such a "substantial adverse effect" under these cir- 
cumstances would constitute a state imposed restriction on 
liberty, the record contains no support for these assump- 
tions. 
Given the overall conservative cast of the balance of 
the Opinion, it may read too much into these qualifying 
observations to suggest that they mark out obvious possi- 
bilities sharply to limit and to distinguish the basic hold- 
ing. Nevertheless, they may imply that on a better record, 
under more compelling circumstances where the faculty 
member is well along the tenure track under policies ex- 
plicitly encouraging reliance and practices consistent with 
that reliance, peremptory notice of nonreappointment may 
not be enough to quench the constitutional claim to more 
specific consideration than none at all. 
Accordingly, the set of Opinions in Roth and Sinder- 
mann together with their full implications may now con- 
front institutions of higher learning with a sharper choice : 
to avoid the "hazard" of even minimum constitutional 
procedures by strategically withdrawing any official en- 
couragement of professional security for the faculty and 
retreating behind the ironplate of seried, short-term 
terminal contracts, thus to reserve a prerogative of pro- 
cedural arbitrariness; or to systematize instead a policy 
of positive incentives with a willingness to provide some 
explanation and opportunity for reconsideration when so 
requested. It may be significant in this regard that in clos- 
ing his Opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart went out of his way 
to note that the Court's decision was confined to a con- 
struction of the Constitution itself and that not all that the 
Constitution tolerates is necessarily "appropriate or wise 
in public colleges and universities." And again there is a 
footnote, by no means disapproving, comparing as an 
example the AAUP's Statement on Procedural Standards 
in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments. 
A Postscript on the Substantive Constitutional 
Freedoms of the Faculty 
Nothing in either Roth or Sindermann at all impairs 
the statutory right of a faculty member to secure full re- 
dress in an appropriate federal court upon proof of his 
allegation that his nonreappointment was significantly 
influenced by considerations foreclosed by the Bill of 
Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. In both Roth and 
Sindermann, the Supreme Court remanded the cases to the 
federal district courts to consider the merits of each fac- 
ulty member's first amendment claim that the decision of 
nonreappointment was in retaliation for critical public 
utterances which the faculty member alleged to be pro- 
tected by the First Amendment. With no dissent to this 
proposition, Mr. Justice Stewart observed: 
The first question presented is whether the respondent's 
lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment, 
taken alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewal of his 
contract violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
We hold that it does not. 
In this respect, the decision fully confirmed prior holdings 
of Supreme Court cases that lack of tenure has no effect 
upon the substantive equal protection of First Amend- 
ment rights, and it wholly lays to rest inconsistent dicta 
which had appeared in certain lower court decisions (e.g., 
Jones v. Hopper, 110 F.2d 1323 [10th Cir. 1970]). The 
problem does remain as a result of Roth, however, that 
the practical risk of retaliatory nonreappointment is 
doubtless enhanced insofar as no explanation or intra- 
mural hearing of any kind need be provided. 
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APPENDIX 
[The following is reprinted from The United States Law Week, Vol. 40, pp. 5079-5091, June 27, 1972.] 
The Board of Regents of State Colleges et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
David F. Roth, Etc. 
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In 1968 the respondent, David Roth, was hired for his first 
teaching job as assistant professor of political science at Wis- 
consin State University-Oshkosh. He was hired for a fixed 
term of one academic year. The notice of his faculty appoint- 
ment specified that his employment would begin on September 
1, 1968, and would end on June 30, 1969.1 The respondent 
completed that term. But he was informed that he would not 
be rehired for the next academic year. 
The respondent had no tenure rights to continued employ- 
ment. Under Wisconsin statutory law a state university teacher 
can acquire tenure as a "permanent" employee only after four 
years of year-to-year employment. Having acquired tenure, a 
teacher is entitled to continued employment "during efficiency 
and good behavior." A relatively new teacher without tenure, 
however, is under Wisconsin law entitled to nothing beyond 
his one-year appointment.2 There are no statutory or admin- 
istrative standards defining eligibility for re-employment. State 
law thus clearly leaves the decision whether to rehire a non- 
tenured teacher for another year to the unfettered discretion of 
University officials. 
The procedural protection afforded a Wisconsin State Uni- 
versity teacher before he is separated from the University 
corresponds to his job security. As a matter of statutory law, a 
tenured teacher cannot be "discharged except for cause upon 
written charges" and pursuant to certain procedures.3 A non- 
tenured teacher, similarly, is protected to some extent during 
his one-year term. Rules promulgated by the Board of Regents 
provide that a nontenured teacher "dismissed" before the end 
of the year may have some opportunity for review of the "dis- 
missal." But the Rules provide no real protection for a non- 
tenured teacher who simply is not re-employed for the next 
year. He must be informed by February first "concerning 
retention or non-retention for the ensuing year." But "no 
reason for non-retention need be given. No review or appeal 
is provided in such case." * 
In conformance with these Rules, the President of Wisconsin 
State University-Oshkosh informed the respondent before 
February 1, 1969, that he would not be rehired for the 1969- 
1970 academic year. He gave the respondent no reason for 
the decision and no opportunity to challenge it at any sort of 
hearing. 
The respondent then brought this action in a federal district 
court alleging that the decision not to rehire him for the next 
year infringed his Fourteenth Amendment rights. He attacked 
the decision both in substance and procedure. First, he alleged 
that the true reason for the decision was to punish him for cer- 
tain statements critical of the University administration, and 
that it therefore violated his right to freedom of speech.5 
Second, he alleged that the failure of University officials to 
give him notice of any reason for nonretention and an oppor- 
tunity for a hearing violated his right to procedural due process 
of law. 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
respondent on the procedural issue, ordering the University 
officials to provide him with reasons and a hearing. 310 F. 
Supp. 972. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, 
affirmed this partial summary judgment. 446 F. 2d 806. We 
granted certiorari. 404 U. S. 909. The only question presented 
to us at this stage in the case is whether the respondent had a 
constitutional right to a statement of reasons and a hearing on 
the University's decision not to rehire him for another year.4 
We hold that he did not. 
I 
The requirements of procedural due process apply only to 
the deprivation of interests encompassed within the Fourteenth 
Amendment's protection of liberty and property. When pro- 
tected interests are implicated the right to some kind of prior 
hearing is paramount.7 But the range of interests protected by 
procedural due process is not infinite. 
The District Court decided that procedural due process guar- 
antees apply in this case by assessing and balancing the weights 
of the particular interests involved. It concluded that the 
1 The respondent had no contract of employment. Rather, his formal 
notice of appointment was the equivalent of an employment contract. 
The notice of his appointment provided that: "David F. Roth is hereby 
appointed to the faculty of the Wisconsin State University Position num- 
ber 0262. (Location:) Oshkosh as (Rank:) Assistant Professor of (De- 
partment:) Political Science this (Date:) first day of (Month:) Septem- 
ber (Year:) 1968.*' The notice went on to specify that the respondent's 
"appointment basis" was for the "academic year. And it provided that 
"[regulations governing tenure are in accord with Chapter 37.31, Wis- 
consin Statutes. The employment of any staff member for an academic 
year shall not be for a term beyond June 30th of the fiscal year in which 
the appointment is made." See n. 2, infra. 2 Wisconsin Statutes 1967, c. 37.31 (1), in force at the time, provided 
in pertinent part that: 
"All teachers in any state university shall initially be employed on 
probation. The employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and 
good behavior, after 4 years of continuous service in the state university 
system as a teacher." 3 Wisconsin Statutes 1967, c. 37.31, in force at the time, provided in 
pertinent part that: 
"No teacher who has become permanently employed as herein pro- 
vided shall be discharged except for cause upon written charges. Within 
30 days of receiving the written charges, such teacher may appeal the 
discharge by a written notice to the president of the board of regents of 
state colleges. The board shall cause the charges to be investigated, hear 
the case and provide such teacher with a written statement as to their 
decision." 
* The Rules, promulgated by the Board of Regents in 1967, provide: 
"RULE I- February 1st is established throughout the State University 
system as the deadline for written notification of non-tenured faculty con- 
cerning retention or non-retention for the ensuing year. The President of 
each University shall give such notice each year on or before this date." 
"RULE II - During the time a faculty member is on probation, no reason 
for non-retention need be given. No review or appeal is provided in such 
case. 
"RULE III - 'Dismissal' as opposed to 'Non-Retention' means termina- 
tion of responsibilities during an academic year. When a non-tenured 
faculty member is dismissed he has no right under Wisconsin Statutes to 
a review of his case or to appeal. The President may, however, in his 
discretion, grant a request for a review within the institution, either by a 
faculty committee or by the President, or both. Any such review would 
be informal in nature and would be advisory only. 
"RULE IV - When a non-tenured faculty member is dismissed he may 
request a review by or hearing before the Board of Regents. Each such 
request will be considered separately and the Board will, in its discretion, 
grant or deny same in each individual case." 5 While the respondent alleged that he was- not rehired because of his 
exercise of free speech, the petitioners insisted that the non-retention 
decision was based on other, constitutionally valid grounds. The District 
Court came to no conclusion whatever regarding the true reason for the 
University President's decision. "In the present case," it stated, "it 
appears that a determination as to the actual bases of [the] decision must 
await amplification of the facts at trial. . . . Summary judgment is inap- 
propriate." 310 F. Supp., at 982. 6 The courts that have had to decide whether a nontenured public em- 
ployee has a right to a statement of reasons or a hearing upon non- 
renewal of his contract have come to varying conclusions. Some have 
held that neither procedural safeguard is required. E. g., Orr v. Trinter, 
444 F. 2d 128 (CA6); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F. 2d 1323 (CA10); Freeman 
v. Gould Special School District, 405 F. 2d 1153 (CA8). At least one 
court has held that there is a right to a statement of reasons but not a 
hearing. Drown v. Portsmouth School District, 435 F. 2d 1182 (CA1). 
And another has held that both requirements depend on whether the 
employee has an "expectency" of continued employment. Ferguson v. 
Thomas, 430 F. 2d 852, 856 (CA5). 7 Before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be af- 
forded opportunity for some kind of a hearing, "except for extraordinary 
situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies 
postponing the hearing until after the event." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 
U. S. 371, 379. "While '[m]any controversies have raged about ... the 
Due Process Clause,' ... it is fundamental that except in emergency 
situations [and this is not one] due process requires that when a State 
seeks to terminate [a protected] interest . . . , it must afford 'notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the 
termination becomes effective." Bell v. Bur son, 402 U. S. 535, 542. For 
the rare and extraordinary situations in which we have held that de- 
privation of a protected interest need not be preceded by opportunity for 
some kind of hearing, see, e. g., Central Union Trust Co. v. Gary an 254 
U. S. 554, 566; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 597; Ewing v. 
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594. 
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respondent's interest in re-employment at the Wisconsin State 
University-Oshkosh outweighed the University's interest in 
denying him re-employment summarily. 310 F. Supp., at 
977-979. Undeniably, the respondent's re-employment pros- 
pects were of major concern to him - concern that we surely 
cannot say was insignificant. And a weighing process has long 
been a part of any determination of the form of hearing re- 
quired in particular situations by procedural due process.8 But, 
to determine whether due process requirements apply in the 
first place, we must look not to the "weight" but to the nature 
of the interest at stake. See Morrissey v. Brewer, - U. S. - , 
- 
. We must look to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth 
Amendment's protection of liberty and property. 
"Liberty" and "property" are broad and majestic terms. They 
are among the "[g]reat [constitutional] concepts . . . pur- 
posely left to gather meaning from experience. . . . [T]hey 
relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and 
the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only 
a stagnant society remains unchanged." National Ins. Co. v. 
Tidewater Co., 337 U. S. 582, 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
For that reason the Court has fully and finally rejected the 
wooden distinction between "rights" and "privileges" that once 
seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process 
rights.9 The Court has also made clear that the property in- 
terests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond 
actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.10 By the 
same token, the Court has required due process protection for 
deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints 
imposed by the criminal process.11 
Yet, while the Court has eschewed rigid or formalistic 
limitations on the protection of procedural due process, it has 
at the same time observed certain boundaries. For the words 
"liberty" and "property" in the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment must be given some meaning. 
II 
"While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness 
the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] 
the term has received much consideration, and some of the 
included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God 
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally 
to enjoy those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U. S. 390, 399. In a Constitution for a free people, there 
can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad 
indeed. See, e. g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499-500; 
Stanley v. Illinois, - U. S. - . 
There might be cases in which a State refused to re-employ 
8 "The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, 
depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature 
of the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 
378. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263; Hannah v. Larche, 
363 U. S. 420. The constitutional requirement of opportunity for some 
form of hearing before deprivation of a protected interest, of course, does 
not depend upon such a narrow balancing process. See n. 7, supra. 9 In a leading case decided many years ago, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit held that public employment in general 
was a "privilege," not a "right," and that procedural due process guaran- 
tees therefore were inapplicable. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F. 2d 46, 
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U. S. 918. The basis of this 
holding has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years. For, as 
Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court only last year, "this Court 
now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether 
a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' " 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. See, e. g., Morrissey v. 
Brewer, - U. S. - , - : Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539; Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6; 
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568; Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U. S. 398, 404. 10 See, e. g., Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 208; Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U. S. 535; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254. 11 
"Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' [in the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause] with any great precision, that term is 
not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint." Boiling v. Sharpe, 
347 U. S. 497, 499. See, e. g., Stanley v. Illinois, - U. S. - . 
a person under such circumstances that interests in liberty 
would be implicated. But this is not such a case. 
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not 
make any charge against him that might seriously damage his 
standing and associations in his community. It did not base 
the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that 
he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done 
so, this would be a different case. For "[w]here a person's 
good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because 
of what the government is doing to him, notice and an oppor- 
tunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 
400 U. S. 433, 437. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191; 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317; Peters 
v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 352 (concurring opinion). See 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 898. In such a 
case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the 
charge before University officials.12 In the present case, how- 
ever, there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent's 
interest in his "good name, reputation, honor or integrity" is at 
stake. 
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining 
to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other 
disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of 
other employment opportunities. The State, for example, did 
not invoke any regulations to bar the respondent from all other 
public employment in State universities. Had it done so, this, 
again, would be a different case. For "[t]o be deprived not 
only of present government employment but of future oppor- 
tunity for it is no small injury. . . ." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 185 (Jackson, J., con- 
curring). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41. The Court has 
held, for example, that a State, in regulating eligibility for a 
type of professional employment, cannot foreclose a range of 
opportunities "in a manner . . . that contravene [s] due proc- 
ess," Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 238, 
and, specifically, in a manner that denies the right to a full 
prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 
96, 103. See Cafeteria Workers v. McEhoy, supra, at 898. In 
the present case, however, this principle does not come into 
play.13 
To be sure, the respondent has alleged that the nonrenewal 
of his contract was based on his exercise of his right to free- 
dom of speech. But this allegation is not now before us. The 
District Court stayed proceedings on this issue, and the 
respondent has yet to prove that the decision not to rehire 
him was, in fact, based on his free speech activities.14 
Hence, on the record before us, all that clearly appears is 
that the respondent was not rehired for one year at one 
University. It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a 
person is deprived of "liberty" when he simply is not rehired 
in one job but remains as free as before to seek another. 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 895-896. 
12 The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an 
opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a 
hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future 
employment for other reasons. 13 The District Court made an assumption "that non-retention by one 
university or college creates concrete and practical difficulties for a pro- 
fessor in his subsequent academic career." 310 F. Supp., at 979. And the 
Court of Appeals based its affirmance of the summary judgment largely 
on the premise that "the substantial adverse effect non-retention is likely 
to have upon career interests of an individual professor" amounts to a 
limitation on future employment opportunities sufficient to invoke pro- 
cedural due process guarantees. 446 F. 2d, at 809. But even assuming 
arguendo that such a "substantial adverse effect" under these circum- 
stances would constitute a state imposed restriction on liberty, the record 
contains no support for these assumptions. There is no suggestion of how 
nonretention might affect the respondent's future employment prospects. 
Mere proof, for example, that his record of nonretention in one job, taken 
alone, might make him somewhat less attractive to some other employers 
would hardy establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting 
to a deprivation of "liberty." Cf. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 
supra. 14 See n. 5, infra. The Court of Appeals, nonetheless, argued that op- 
portunity for a hearing and a statement of reasons were required here 
"as a prophylactic against non-retention decisions improperly motivated 
by exercise of protected rights." 446 F. 2d, at 810 (emphasis supplied). 
While the Court of Appeals recognized the lack of a finding that the 
respondent's nonretention was based on exercise of the right of free 
speech, it felt that the respondent's interest in liberty was sufficiently 
implicated here because the decision not to rehire him was made "with 
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Ill 
The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of 
property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person 
has already acquired in specific benefits. These interests - 
property interests - may take many forms. 
Thus the Court has held that a person receiving welfare 
benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining 
eligibility for them has an interest in continued receipt of those 
benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process. Gold- 
berg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254.16 See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 
U. S. 603, 611. Similarly, in the area of public employment, 
the Court has held that a public college professor dismissed 
from an office held under tenure provisions, Slochower v. 
Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, and college professors and 
staff members dismissed during the terms of their contracts, 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, have interests in con- 
tinued employment that are safeguarded by due process. Only 
last year, the Court held that this principle "proscribing sum- 
mary dismissal from public employment without a hearing or 
inquiry required by due process*' also applied to a teacher 
recently hired without tenure or a formal contract, but none- 
theless with a clearly implied promise of continued employ- 
ment. Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207, 208. 
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by pro- 
cedural due process emerge from these decisions. To have a 
property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more 
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more 
than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the 
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon 
which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be 
arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional 
right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to 
vindicate those claims. 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Con- 
stitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law - rules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitle- 
ment to those benefits. Thus the welfare recipients in Goldberg 
v. Kelly, supra, had a claim of entitlement to welfare payments 
that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them. 
The recipients had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within 
the statutory terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a 
right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so. 
a background of controversy and unwelcome expressions of opinion." 
Ibid. 
When a State would directly impinge upon interests in free speech or 
free press, this Court has on occasion held that opportunity for a fair 
adversary hearing must precede the action, whether or not the speech 
or press interest is clearly protected under substantive First Amendment 
standards. Thus we have required fair notice and opportunity for an 
adversary hearing before an injunction is issued against the holding of 
rallies and public meetings. Carroll y. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175. Similarly, we have indicated the necessity of procedural safeguards before 
a State makes a large-scale seizure of a person's allegedly obscene books, 
magazines and so forth. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205; Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51; Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58. See generally 
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518. 
In the respondent's case, however, the State has not directly impinged 
upon interests in free speech or free press in any way comparable to a 
seizure of books or an injunction against meetings. Whatever may be a 
teacher's rights of free speech, the interest in holding a teaching job at a 
state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest. 15 Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, is a related case. 
There, the petitioner was a lawyer who had been refused admission to 
practice before the Board of Tax Appeals. The Board had "published 
rules for admission of persons entitled to practice before it, by which 
attorneys at law admitted to courts of the United States and the States, 
and the District of Columbia, as well as certified public accountants duly 
qualified under the law of any State or the District, are made eligible. 
. . . The rules further provided that the Board may in its discretion deny 
admission to any applicant, or suspend or disbar any person after admis- 
sion." Id., at 119. The Board denied admission to the petitioner under its discretionary power, without a prior hearing and a statement of the 
reasons for the denial. Although this Court disposed of the case on other 
grounds, it stated, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Taft, that the 
existence of the Board's eligibility rules gave the petitioner an interest and 
claim to practice before the Board to which procedural due process 
requirements applied. It said that the Board's discretionary power 
"must be construed to mean the exercise of a discretion to be exercised 
after fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to 
answer for the applicant as would constitute due process.'' Id., at 123. 
Just as the welfare recipients' "property" interest in welfare 
payments was created and defined by statutory terms, so the 
respondent's "property" interest in employment at the Wiscon- 
sin State University-Oshkosh was created and defined by the 
terms of his appointment. Those terms secured his interest in 
employment up to June 30, 1969. But the important fact in 
this case is that they specifically provided that the respondent's 
employment was to terminate on June 30. They did not pro- 
vide for contract renewal absent "sufficient cause." Indeed, they 
made no provision for renewal whatsoever. 
Thus the terms of the respondent's appointment secured 
absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year. 
They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to 
re-employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state statute 
or University rule or policy that secured his interest in re-em- 
ployment or that created any legitimate claim to it.16 In these 
circumstances, the respondent surely had an abstract concern 
in being rehired, but he did not have a property interest suf- 
ficient to require the University authorities to give him a 
hearing when they declined to renew his contract of 
employment. 
IV 
Our analysis of the respondent's constitutional rights in this 
case in no way indicates a view that an opportunity for a 
hearing or a statement of reasons for nonretention would, or 
would not, be appropriate or wise in public colleges and 
universities.17 For it is a written Constitution that we apply. 
Our role is confined to interpretation of that Constitution. 
We must conclude that the summary judgment for the re- 
spondent should not have been granted, since the respondent 
has not shown that he was deprived of liberty or property pro- 
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
// 15 so ordered. 
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this 
case. 
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting. 
Respondent Roth, like Sindermann in the companion case, 
had no tenure under Wisconsin law and, unlike Sindermann, 
he had had only one year of teaching at Wisconsin State 
University-Oshkosh - where from 1968-1969 he had been As- 
sistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies. 
Though Roth was rated by the faculty as an excellent teacher, 
he had publicly criticized the administration for suspending an 
entire group of 94 Black students without determining indi- 
vidual guilt. He also criticized the University's regime as being 
authoritarian and autocratic. He used his classroom to discuss 
what was being done about the Black episode; and one day, 
instead of meeting his class, he went to the meeting of the 
Board of Regents. 
In this case, as in Sindermann, an action was started in a 
Federal District Court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 1 claiming in 
16 To be sure, the respondent does suggest that most teachers hired on 
a year-to-year basis by the Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh are, in 
fact, rehired. But the District Court has not found that there is any- 
thing approaching a "common law" of re-employment, see Perry v. Sindermann, post, at - , so strong as to require University officials to 
give the respondent a statement of reasons and a hearing on their decision not to rehire him. 17 See, e. g., Report of Committee A on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure, "Procedural Standards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty 
Appointments," 56 AAUP Bulletin 21 (Spring 1970). 
1 Section 1983 reads as follows: 
"Every person who, under color or any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im- 
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress." 
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part that the decisions of the school authorities not to rehire 
was in retaliation for his expression of opinion. The District 
Court, in partially granting Roth's motion for summary judg- 
ment, held that the Fourteenth Amendment required the Uni- 
versity to give a hearing to teachers whose contracts were not 
to be renewed and to give reasons for its action. 3 10 F. Supp. 
972, 983. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 446 F. 2d 806. 
Professor Will Herberg of Drew University in writing of 
"academic freedom" recently said: 
... it is sometimes conceived as a basic constitutional right guaranteed 
and protected under the First Amendment. 
But, of course, this is not the case. Whereas a man's right to speak 
out on this or that may be guaranteed and protected, he can have no 
imaginable human or constitutional right to remain a member of a 
university faculty. Clearly, the right to academic freedom is an 
acquired one, yet an acquired right of such value to society that in the 
minds of many it has verged upon the constitutional. [Washington 
Evening Star, Jan. 23, 1972.] 
There may not be a constitutional right to continued em- 
ployment if private schools and colleges are involved. But 
Prof. Herberg's view is not correct when public schools move 
against faculty members. For the First Amendment, appli- 
cable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
protects the individual against state action when it comes to 
freedom of speech and of press and the related freedoms 
guaranteed by the First Amendment; and the Fourteenth pro- 
tects "liberty" and "property" as stated by the Court in 
Sindermann. 
No more direct assault on academic freedom can be 
imagined than for the school authorities to be allowed to dis- 
charge a teacher because of his or her philosophical, political, 
or ideological beliefs. The same may well be true of private 
schools also, if through the device of financing or other 
umbilical cords they become instrumentalities of the State. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated for constitutional theory in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 261-262 (con- 
curring opinion) : 
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings 
made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born 
of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit 
of understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social 
sciences, the concern of which is man and society. The problems that 
are respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psy- 
chology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely depart- 
mentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, with 
interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good - if 
understanding be an essential need of society - inquiries into these 
problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection 
upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must 
abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the 
interest of wise government and the people's well-being, except for 
reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling. 
We repeated that warning in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 
385 U.S. 589, 603: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom. 
When a violation of First Amendment rights is alleged, the 
reasons for dismissal or for nonrenewal of an employment 
contract must be examined to see if the reasons given are only 
a cloak for activity or attitudes protected by the Constitution. 
A statutory analogy is present under the National Labor Rela- 
tions Act, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. While discharges of em- 
ployees for "cause" are permissible (Fibre board Corp. v. 
Labor Board, 379 U. S. 203, 217), discharge because of an 
employee's union activities is banned by § 8(a) (3), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 158 (c) (3). So the search is to ascertain whether the stated 
ground was the real one or only a pretext. See /. P. Stevens 
& Co. v. Labor Board, 380 F. 2d 292, 300. 
In the case of teachers whose contracts are not renewed, 
tenure is not the critical issue. In the Sweezy case, the teacher, 
whose First Amendment rights we honored, had no tenure but 
was only a guest lecturer. In the Keyishian case, one of the 
petitioners (Keyishian himself) had only a "one-year-term con- 
tract" that was not renewed. 385 U. S., at 592. In Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, one of the petitioners was a teacher 
whose "contract for the ensuing school year was not renewed" 
(id., at 483) and two others who refused to comply were ad- 
vised that it made "impossible their re-employment as teachers 
for the following school year." Id., at 484. The oath required 
in Keyishian and the affidavit listing memberships required in 
Shelton were both, in our view, in violation of First Amend- 
ment rights. Those cases mean that conditioning renewal of a 
teacher's contract upon surrender of First Amendment rights 
is beyond the power of a State. 
There is sometimes a conflict between a claim for First 
Amendment protection and the need for orderly administration 
of the school system, as we noted in Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U. S. 563, 569. That is one reason why sum- 
mary judgments in this class of cases are seldom appropriate. 
Another reason is that careful fact finding is often necessary to 
know whether the given reason for nonrenewal of a teacher's 
contract is the real reason or a feigned one. 
It is said that since teaching in a public school is a privilege, 
the State can grant it or withhold it on conditions. We have, 
however, rejected that thesis in numerous cases, e. g., Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. See Van Alstyne, The 
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional 
Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968). In Hannegan v. Esquire, 
111 U. S. 146, 156, we said that Congress may not by with- 
drawal of mailing privileges place limitations on freedom of 
speech which it could not do constitutionally if done directly. 
We said in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 
U. S. 382, 402, that freedom of speech was abridged when the 
only restraint on its exercise was withdrawal of the privilege to 
invoke the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board. 
In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, we held that an ap- 
plicant could not be denied the opportunity for public employ- 
ment because he had exercised his First Amendment rights. 
And in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, we held that a denial 
of a tax exemption unless one gave up his First Amendment 
rights was an abridgement of Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
As we held in Speiser v. Randall, supra, when a State pro- 
poses to deny a privilege to one who it alleges has engaged in 
unprotected speech, Due Process requires that the State bear 
the burden of proving that the speech was not protected. "The 
protection of the individual against arbitrary action . . . [is] 
the very essence of due process," Slochower v. Board of Higher 
Education, 350 U. S. 551, 559 (1956), but where the State is 
allowed to act secretly behind closed doors and without any 
notice to those who are affected by its actions, there is no 
check against the possibility of such "arbitrary action." 
Moreover, where "important interests" of the citizen are 
implicated (Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539) they are not to 
be denied or taken away without Due Process. Id., at 539. 
Bell v. Burson involved a driver's license. But also included 
are disqualification for unemployment compensation (Sher- 
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398), discharge from public employ- 
ment (Slochower v. Board of Education, supra), denial of tax 
exemption (Speiser v. Randall, supra), or withdrawal of wel- 
fare benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254. And see 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433. We should now 
add that nonrenewal of a teacher's contract, whether or not he 
has tenure, is an entitlement of the same importance and 
dignity. 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, is not opposed. 
It held that a cook employed in a cafeteria in a military instal- 
lation was not entitled to a hearing prior to the withdrawal of 
her access to the facility. Her employer was prepared to 
employ her at another of its restaurants, the withdrawal was 
not likely to injure her reputation, and her employment op- 
portunities elsewhere were not impaired. The Court held that 
the very limited individual interest in this one job did not out- 
weigh the Government's authority over an important federal 
military establishment. Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is 
tantamount in effect to a dismissal and the consequences may 
be enormous. Nonrenewal can be a blemish that turns into a 
permanent scar and effectively limits any chance the teacher 
has of being rehired as a teacher at least in his State. 
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If this nonrenewal implicated the First Amendment, then 
Roth was deprived of constitutional rights (a) because his 
employment was conditioned on a surrender of First Amend- 
ment rights and (b) because he received no notice and hearing 
of the adverse action contemplated against him. Without a 
statement of the reasons for the discharge and an opportunity 
to rebut those reasons - both of which were refused by peti- 
tioners - there is no means short of a lawsuit to safeguard the 
right not to be discharged for the exercise of First Amendment 
guarantees. 
The District Court held, 310 F. Supp. 972, 979-980: 
Substantive constitutional protection for a university professor 
against non-retention in violation of his First Amendment rights or 
arbitrary non-retention is useless without procedural safeguards. I hold 
that minimal procedural due process includes a statement of the 
reasons why the university intends not to retain the professor, notice 
of a hearing at which he may respond to the stated reasons, and a 
hearing if the professor appears at the appointed time and place. At 
such a hearing the professor must have a reasonable opportunity to 
submit evidence relevant to the stated reasons. The burden of going 
forward and the burden of proof rests with the professor. Only if he 
makes a reasonable showing that the stated reasons are wholly inap- 
propriate as a basis for decision or that they are wholly without basis in fact would the university administration become obliged to show 
that the stated reasons are not inappropriate or that they have a basis 
in fact. 
It was that procedure that the Court of Appeals approved. 
446 F. 2d 806, 809-810. The Court of Appeals also concluded 
that though the § 1983 action was pending in court, the court 
should stay its hand until the academic procedures had been 
completed.2 As stated by the Court of Appeals in Sindermann: 
School-constituted review bodies are the most appropriate forums for 
initially determining issues of this type, both for the convenience of the 
parties and in order to bring academic expertise to bear in resolving 
the nice issues of administrative discipline, teacher competence and 
school policy, which so frequently must be balanced in reaching a 
proper determination. [430 F. 2d, at 944-945.] 
That is a permissible course for District Courts to take, 
though it does not relieve them of the final determination 
whether nonrenewal of the teacher's contract was in retaliation 
of the exercise of First Amendment rights. 
Accordingly I would affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting. 
Respondent was hired as an assistant professor of political 
science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh for the 1968- 
1969 academic year. During the course of that year he was 
told that he would not be rehired for the next academic term, 
but he was never told why. In this case he asserts that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution entitled him to a statement of reasons and a 
hearing on the University's decision not to rehire him for an- 
other year.1 This claim was sustained by the District Court 
which granted respondent summary judgment, 310 F. Supp. 
972, and by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment 
of the District Court. 446 F. 2d 806. This Court today re- 
verses the judgment of the Court of Apeals and rejects respon- 
dent's claim. I dissent. 
While I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion, setting 
forth the proper framework for consideration of the issue pre- 
2 Such a procedure would not be contrary to the well-settled rule that 
§ 1983 actions do not require exhaustion of other remedies. See, e. g., 
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249 (1971); Damico v. California, 
389 U. S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). One of the allegations 
in the complaint was that respondent was denied any effective state 
remedy and the District Court's staying its hand thus furthered than 
thwarted the purposes of $ 1983. 
1 Respondent has also alleged that the true reason for the decision not 
to rehire him was to punish him for certain statements critical of the 
University. As the Court points out, this issue is not before us at the 
present time. 
sented, and also with those portions of Parts II and III of the 
Court's opinion that assert that a public employee is entitled to 
procedural due process whenever a State stigmatizes him by 
denying employment, or injures his future employment pros- 
pects severely, or whenever the State deprives him of a prop- 
erty interest, I would go further than the Court does in defining 
the terms of "liberty" and "property." 
The prior decisions of this Court, discussed at length in the 
opinion of the Court, establish a principle that is as obvious as 
it is compelling - i. e., federal and state governments and 
governmental agencies are restrained by the Constitution from 
acting arbitrarily with respect to employment opportunities 
that they either offer or control. Hence, it is now firmly 
established that whether or not a private employer is free to act 
capriciously or unreasonably with respect to employment 
practices, at least absent statutory 2 or contractual 8 controls, a 
government employer is different. The government may only 
act fairly and reasonably. 
This Court has long maintained that "the right to work for 
a living in the common occupations of the community is of the 
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it 
was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure." 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 41 (1915) (Hughes, J.). See 
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). It has 
also established that the fact that an employee has no con- 
tract guaranteeing work for a specific future period does not 
mean that as the result of action by the government he may be 
"discharged at any time for any reason or for no reason." 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S., at 38. 
In my view, every citizen who applies for a government job 
is entitled to it unless the government can establish some 
reason for denying the employment. This is the "property" 
right that I believe is protected by the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment and that cannot be denied "without due process of law." 
And it is also liberty - liberty to work - which is the "very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity" secured by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This Court has often had occasion to note that the denial of 
public employment is a serious blow to any citizen. See, e. g., 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 
123, 185 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. 
Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 316-317 (1946). Thus, when an appli- 
cation for public employment is denied or the contract of a 
government employee is not renewed, the government must say 
why, for it is only when the reasons underlying government 
action are known that citizens feel secure and protected against 
arbitrary government action. 
Employment is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, bene- 
fits that governments offer in modern-day life. When some- 
thing as valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the 
government may not reward some citizens and not others 
without demonstrating that its actions are fair and equitable. 
And it is procedural due process that is our fundamental 
guarantee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capri- 
cious, and unreasonable government action. 
Mr. Justice Douglas has written that 
It is not without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the dif- 
ference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast 
adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that 
there will be equal justice under law. [Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com- 
mittee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 179.] 
And Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said that "[t]he history of 
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of pro- 
cedure." Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 414 (1945). 
With respect to occupations controlled by the government one 
lower court has said that "[t]he public has the right to expect 
its officers ... to make adjudications on the basis of merit. 
The first step toward insuring that these expectations are 
2 See, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971); 42 U. S. C. « 2000e. 3 Cf. Note, Procedural "Due Process" in Union Disciplinary Proceed- 
ings, 57 Yale L. J. 1302 (1948). 
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realized is to require adherence to the standards of due process; 
absolute and uncontrolled discretion invites abuse." Hornsby 
v. Allen, 326 F. 2d 610 (CA5 1964). 
We have often noted that procedural due process means 
many different things in the numerous contexts in which it 
applies. See, e. g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 262 (1970); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971). Prior decisions have 
held that an applicant for admission to practice as an attorney 
before the United States Board of Tax Appeals may not be 
rejected without a statement of reasons and a chance for a 
hearing on disputed issues of fact; * that a tenured teacher 
could not be summarily dismissed without notice of the reasons 
and a hearing; B that an applicant for admission to a state bar 
could not be denied the opportunity to practice law without 
notice of the reasons for the rejection of his application and a 
hearing; e and even that a substitute teacher who had been 
employed only two months could not be dismissed merely 
because she refused to take a loyalty oath without an inquiry 
into the specific facts of her case and a hearing on those in 
dispute.7 I would follow these cases and hold that respondent 
was denied due process when his contract was not renewed 
and he was not informed of the reasons and given an oppor- 
tunity to respond. 
It may be argued that to provide procedural due process to 
all public employees or prospective employees would place an 
intolerable burden on the machinery of government. Cf. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra. The short answer to that argument 
is that it is not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist. 
Whenever an application for employment is denied, an em- 
ployee is discharged, or a decision not to rehire an employee is 
made, there should be some reason for the decision. It can 
scarcely be argued that government would be crippled by a 
requirement that the reason be communicated to the person 
most directly affected by the government's action. 
Where there are numerous applicants for jobs, it is likely 
that few will choose to demand reasons for not being hired. 
But, if the demand for reasons is exceptionally great, summary 
procedures can be devised that would provide fair and ade- 
quate information to all persons. As long as the government 
has a good reason for its actions it need not fear disclosure. 
It is only where the government acts improperly that pro- 
cedural due process is truly burdensome. And that is precisely 
when it is most necessary. 
It might also be argued that to require a hearing and a 
statement of reasons is to require a useless act, because a gov- 
ernment bent on denying employment to one or more persons 
will do so regardless of the procedural hurdles that are placed 
in its path. Perhaps this is so, but a requirement of procedural 
regularity at least renders arbitrary action more difficult. 
Moreover, proper procedures will surely eliminate some of the 
arbitrariness that results not from malice, but from innocent 
error. "Experience teaches . . . that the affording of procedural 
safeguards, which by their nature serve to illuminate the under- 
lying facts, in itself operates to prevent erroneous decisions on 
the merits from occurring." Silver v. New York Stock Ex- 
change, 311 U. S. 341, 366 (1963). When the government 
knows it may have to justify its decisions with sound reasons, 
its conduct is likely to be more cautious, careful, and correct. 
Professor Gellhorn put the argument well: 
In my judgment, there is no basic division of interest between the 
citizenry on the one hand and officialdom on the other. Both should 
be interested equally in the quest for procedural safeguards. I echo 
the late Justice Jackson in saying: "Let it not be overlooked that due 
process of law is not for the sole benefit of the accused. It is the best 
assurance for Government itself against those blunders which leave 
lasting strains on a system of justice" - blunders which are likely to 
occur when reasons need not be given and when the reasonableness and 
indeed legality of judgments need not be subjected to any appraisal 
than one's own. [6 J. Soc. Pub. Teachers of L. 70 (1961).] 
Accordingly, I dissent. 
4 Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117 (1926). s Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U. S. SSI (1956). 
• Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U. S. 96 (1963). 7 Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U. S. 207 (1972). 
Charles R. Perry et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
Robert P. Sindermann, etc. 
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. 
From 1959 to 1969 the respondent, Robert Sindermann, 
was a teacher in the state college system of the State of Texas. 
After teaching for two years at the University of Texas and 
for four years at San Antonio Junior College, he became a 
professor of Government and Social Science at Odessa Junior 
College in 1965. He was employed at the college for four 
successive years, under a series of one-year contracts. He was 
successful enough to be appointed, for a time, the cochairman 
of his department. 
During the 1968-1969 academic year, however, controversy 
arose between the respondent and the College administration. 
The respondent was elected president of the Texas Junior 
College Teachers Association. In this capacity, he left his 
teaching duties on several occasions to testify before com- 
mittees of the Texas Legislature, and he became involved in 
public disagreements with the policies of the college's Board 
of Regents. In particular, he aligned himself with a group 
advocating the elevation of the College to four-year status - 
a change opposed by the Regents. And, on one occasion, a 
newspaper advertisement appeared over his name that was 
highly critical of the Regents. 
Finally, in May 1969, the respondent's one-year employ- 
ment contract terminated and the Board of Regents voted not 
to offer him a new contract for the next academic year. The 
Regents issued a press release setting forth allegations of the 
respondent's insubordination.1 But they provided him no 
official statement of the reasons for the nonrenewal of his 
contract. And they allowed him no opportunity for a hearing 
to challenge the basis of the nonrenewal. 
The respondent then brought this action in a federal dis- 
trict court. He alleged primarily that the Regents' decision 
not to rehire him was based on his public criticism of the 
policies of the college administration and thus infringed his 
right to freedom of speech. He also alleged that their failure 
to provide him an opportunity for a hearing violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of procedural due process. 
The petitioners - members of the Board of Regents and the 
president of the College - denied that their decision was made 
in retaliation for the respondent's public criticism and argued 
that they had no obligation to provide a hearing.2 On the 
basis of these bare pleadings and three brief affidavits filed 
by the respondent,8 the District Court granted summary judg- 
ment for the petitioners. It concluded that the respondent 
had "no cause of action against the [petitioners] since his 
contract of employment terminated May 31, 1969, and 
Odessa Junior College has not adopted the tenure system." 4 
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the District 
Court. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F. 2d 939. First, it held 
that, despite the respondent's lack of tenure, the nonrenewal 
of his contract would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if 
it in fact was based on his protected free speech. Since the 
actual reason for the Regents' decision was "in total dispute" 
in the pleadings, the court remanded the case for a full hear- 
ing on this contested issue of fact. Id., at 942-943. Second, 
the Court of Appeals held that, despite the respondent's lack 
of tenure, the failure to allow him an opportunity for a hear- 
ing would violate the constitutional guarantee of procedural 
due process if the respondent could show that he had an 
"expectancy" of re-employment. It, therefore, ordered that 
1 The press release stated, for example, that the respondent had defied his superiors by attending legislative committee meetings when college 
officials had specifically refused to permit him to leave his classes for that 
purpose. 2 The petitioners claimed, in their motion for summary judgment, that the decision not to retain the respondent was really based on his insub- 
ordinate conduct. See n. 1, supra. 3 The petitioners for whom summary judgment was granted, submitted 
no affidavits whatever. The respondent's affidavits were very short and 
essentially repeated the general allegations of his complaint. * The findings and conclusions of the District Court- only several lines 
long - are not officially reported. 
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this issue of fact also be aired upon remand. Id., at 943-944. 
We granted a writ of certiorari, 403 U.S. 917, and we have 
considered this case along with Board of Regents v. Roth, 
ante. 
I 
The first question presented is whether the respondent's 
lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment, taken 
alone, defeats his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that 
it does not. * 
For at least a quarter century, this Court has made clear that 
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable govern- 
mental benefit and even though the government may deny him 
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons 
upon which the government may not act. It may not deny a 
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally 
protected interests - especially, his interest in freedom of 
speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person 
because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, 
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and 
inhibited. This would allow the government to "produce a 
result which [it] could not command directly." Speiser v. 
Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526. Such interference with con- 
stitutional rights is impermissible. 
We have applied this general principle to denials of tax ex- 
emptions, Speiser v. Randall, supra, unemployment benefits, 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404-405, and welfare pay- 
ments, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 627 n. 6; Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374. But, most often, we have 
applied the principle to denials of public employment. United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100; Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 192; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 
479, 485-486; Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 495-496; 
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 894; Cramp 
v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278, 288; Baggett v. 
Bullitt, 311 U. S. 360; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 17; 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-606; White- 
hill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54; United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 
258; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563, 568. We 
have applied the principle regardless of the public employee's 
contractual or other claim to a job. Compare Pickering v. 
Board of Education, supra, with Shelton v. Tucker, supra. 
Thus the respondent's lack of a contractual or tenure "right" 
to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is im- 
material to his free speech claim. Indeed, twice before, this 
Court has specifically held that the nonrenewal of a non- 
tenured public school teacher's one-year contract may not be 
predicated on his exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. Sheldon v. Tucker, supra; Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents, supra. We reaffirm those holdings here. 
In this case, of course, the respondent has yet to show that 
the decision not to renew his contract was, in fact, made in 
retaliation for his exercise of the constitutional right of free 
speech. The District Court foreclosed any opportunity to make 
this showing when it granted summary judgment. Hence, we 
cannot now hold that the Board of Regents' action was invalid. 
But we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is a 
genuine dispute as to "whether the college refused to renew 
the teaching contract on an impermissible basis - as a reprisal 
for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." 430 F. 
2d, at 943. The respondent has alleged that his nonretention 
was based on his testimony before legislative committees and 
his other public statements critical of the Regents' policies. 
And he has alleged that this public criticism was within the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment's protection of freedom of 
speech. Plainly, these allegations present a bona fide constitu- 
tional claim. For this Court has held that a teacher's public 
criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern may be 
constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an imper- 
missible basis for termination of his employment. Pickering v. 
Board of Education, supra. 
For this reason we hold that the grant of summary judg- 
ment against the respondent, without full exploration of this 
issue, was improper. 
II 
The respondent's lack of formal contractual or tenure 
security in continued employment at Odessa Junior College, 
though irrelevant to his free speech claim, is highly relevant 
to his procedural due process claim. But it may not be entirely 
dispositive. 
We have held today in Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, that 
the Constitution does not require opportunity for a hearing 
before the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher's contract, 
unless he can show that the decision not to rehire him some- 
how deprived him of an interest in "liberty" or that he had a 
"property" interest in continued employment, despite the lack 
of tenure or a formal contract. In Roth the teacher had not 
made a showing on either point to justify summary judgment 
in his favor. 
Similarly, the respondent here has yet to show that he has 
been deprived of an interest that could invoke procedural due 
process protection. As in Roth, the mere showing that he was 
not rehired in one particular job, without more, did not amount 
to a showing of a loss of liberty/' Nor did it amount to a 
showing of a loss of property. 
But the respondent's allegations - which we must construe 
most favorably to the respondent at this stage of the litigation 
- do raise a genuine issue as to his interest in continued em- 
ployment at Odessa Junior College. He alleged that this 
interest, though not secured by a formal contractual tenure 
provision, was secured by a no less binding understanding 
fostered by the College administration. In particular, the 
respondent alleged that the College had a de facto tenure pro- 
gram, and that he had tenure under that program. He claimed 
that he and others legitimately relied upon an unusual pro- 
vision that had been in the College official Faculty Guide for 
many years: 
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Admin- istration of the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has 
permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory and 
as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers and 
his superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work. 
Moreover, the respondent claimed legitimate reliance upon 
guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the 
Texas College and University System that provided that a 
person, like himself, who had been employed as a teacher in 
the state college and university system for seven years or more 
has some form of job tenure.6 Thus the respondent offered to 
5 The Court of Appeals suggested that the respondent might have a due 
process right to some kind of hearing simply if he asserts to college 
officials that their decision was based on his constitutionally protected 
conduct. 430 F. 2d, at 944. We have rejected this approach in Board of 
Regents v. Roth, ante, at - n. 14. 6 The relevant portion of the guidelines, adopted as "Policy Paper 1" 
by the Coordinating Board on October 16, 1967, reads: 
"A. Tenure 
"Tenure means assurance to an experienced faculty member that he 
may expect to continue in his academic position unless adequate cause for dismissal is demonstrated in a fair hearing, following established 
procedures of due process. 
"A specific system of faculty tenure undergirds the integrity of each 
academic institution. In the Texas public colleges and universities, this tenure system should have these components: 
"(1) Beginning with appointment to the rank of full-time instructor or 
a higher rank, the probationary period for a faculty member shall not 
exceed seven years, including within this period appropriate full-time 
service in all institutions of higher education. This is subject to the pro- 
vision that when, after a term of probationary service of more than three 
years in one or more institutions, a faculty member is employed by 
another institution, it may be agreed in writing that his new appointment is for a probationary period of not more than four years (even though 
thereby the person's total probationary period in the academic profession is extended beyond the normal maximum of seven years). 
"(3) Adequate cause for dismissal for a faculty member with tenure 
may be established by demonstrating professional incompetence, moral 
turpitude, or gross neglect of professional responsibilities." 
The respondent alleges that, because he has been employed as a "full- time instructor" or professor within the Texas College and University System for 10 years, he should have "tenure" under these provisions. 
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prove that a teacher, with his long period of service, at this 
particular State College had no less a "property" interest in 
continued employment than a formally tenured teacher at 
other colleges, and had no less a procedural due process right 
to a statement of reasons and a hearing before college officials 
upon their decision not to retain him. 
We have made clear in Roth, ante, at - , that "property" 
interests subject to procedural due process protection are not 
limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, "property" 
denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by "existing 
rules or understandings." Id., at - . A person's interest in a 
benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if 
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that 
support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may 
invoke at a hearing. Ibid. 
A written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly 
is evidence of a formal understanding that supports a teacher's 
claim of entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient 
"cause" is shown. Yet absence of such an explicit contractual 
provision may not always foreclose the possibility that a 
teacher has a "property" interest in re-employment. For ex- 
ample, the law of contracts in most, if not all, jurisdictions long 
has employed a process by which agreements, though not 
formalized in writing, may be "implied." 3 Corbin on Con- 
tracts, §§ 56 1-672 A. Explicit contractual provisions may be 
supplemented by other agreements implied from "the 
promisor's words and conduct in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances." Id., at § 562. And, "[t]he meaning of [the 
promisor's] words and acts is found by relating them to the 
usage of the past." Ibid. 
A teacher, like the respondent, who has held his position for 
a number of years, might be able to show from the circum- 
stances of this service - and from other relevant facts - that he 
has a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure. Just as this 
Court has found there to be a "common law of a particular 
industry or of a particular plant" that may supplement a col- 
lective-bargaining agreement, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Co., 363 U. S. 574, 579, so there may be an unwritten "com- 
mon law" in a particular university that certain employees shall 
have the equivalent of tenure. This is particularly likely in a 
college or university, like Odessa Junior College, that has no 
explicit tenure system even for senior members of its faculty, 
but that nonetheless may have created such a system in 
practice. See Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher 
Education 17-28.7 
In this case, the respondent has alleged the existence of rules 
and understandings, promulgated and fostered by state officials, 
that may justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to con- 
tinued employment absent "sufficient cause." We disagree with 
the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that a mere subjective 
"expectancy" is protected by procedural due process, but we 
agree that the respondent must be given an opportunity to 
prove the legitimacy of his claim of such entitlement in light 
of "the policies and practices of the institution." 430 F. 2d, at 
943. Proof of such a property interest would not, of course, 
entitle him to reinstatement. But such proof would obligate 
college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he 
could be informed of the grounds for his nonretention and 
challenge their sufficiency. 
Therefore, while we do not wholly agree with the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals, its judgment remanding this case to the 
District Court is 
Affirmed. 
7 We do not now hold that the respondent has any such legitimate 
claim of entitlement to job tenure. For "[p] roper ty interests ... are not 
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimen- 
sions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as State law. . . ." Board of Regents v. Roth, 
ante, at - . If it is the law of Texas that a teacher in the respondent's 
position has no contractual or other claim to job tenure, the respondent's 
claim would be defeated. 
Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this 
case. 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's judgments and opinions in Perry and 
Roth, but there is one central point in both decisions that I 
would like to underscore since it may have been obscured in 
the comprehensive discussion of the cases. That point is that 
the relationship between a state institution and one of its 
teachers is essentially a matter of state concern and state law. 
The Court holds today only that a state-employed teacher who 
has a right to re-employment under state law, arising from 
either an express or implied contract, has, in turn, a right guar- 
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to some form of prior 
administrative or academic hearing on the cause for non- 
renewal of his contract. Thus whether a particular teacher in 
a particular context has any right to such administrative 
hearing hinges on a question of state law. The Court's opinion 
makes this point very sharply: 
Property interests . . . are created and their dimensions are defined 
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent 
source such as state law. . . ." Board of Regents v. Roth, ante, at pp. 
12-13. 
Because the availability of the Fourteenth Amendment right 
to a prior administrative hearing turns in each case on a 
question of state law, the issue of abstention will arise in future 
cases contesting whether a particular teacher is entitled to a 
hearing prior to nonrenewal of his contract. If relevant state 
contract law is unclear, a federal court should, in my view, 
abstain from deciding whether he is constitutionally entitled 
to a prior hearing, and the teacher should be left to resort to 
state courts on the questions arising under the state law. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas 
joins, dissenting in No. 71-162 and dissenting in part in No. 
70-36. 
Although I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion in No. 
70-36, I also agree with my Brother Marshall "that respon- 
dent [s] [were] denied due process when [their] contract [s] 
[were] not renewed and [they were] not informed of the 
reasons and given an opportunity to respond." Post, at - . Since 
respondents were entitled to summary judgment on that issue, I 
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 
71-162, and, to the extent indicated by my Brother Marshall, 
I would modify the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 
70-36. 
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in part. 
Respondent was a teacher in the state college system of the 
State of Texas for a decade before the Board of Regents of 
Odessa Junior College decided not to renew his contract. He 
brought this suit in Federal District Court claiming that the 
decision not to rehire him was retaliation for his public 
criticism of the policies of the college administration in viola- 
tion of the First Amendment, and that because the decision 
was made without giving him a statement of reasons and a 
hearing, it denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court granted summary 
judgment for petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed 
and remanded the case for further proceedings. This Court 
affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I agree with Part I of the Court's opinion holding that re- 
spondent has presented a bona fide First Amendment claim 
that should be considered fully by the District Court. But, for 
the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Board of Regents 
v. Roth, No. 71-162, ante, at - , I would modify the judg- 
ment of the Court of Appeals to direct the District Court to 
enter summary judgment for respondent entitling him to a 
statement of reasons why his contract was not renewed and a 
hearing on disputed issues of fact. 
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